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EDUCATION-DuE PROCESS FOR WASHINGTON PUBLIC SCHOOL
STUDENTS-WASH. AD. CODE ch. 180-40 (1972).
The extension of fourteenth amendment due process rights to stu-
dents in the public schools is a relatively recent phenomenon in educa-
tional law. In contrast to the earlier emphasis upon student responsi-
bilities, there is now an increasing recognition of student constitu-
tional rights.1 In Washington, legislation and administrative rules
promulgated by the State Board of Education have conferred the
basic protections of constitutional due process upon pupils from kin-
dergarten through high school.2 This note will discuss the effect of
these enactments on the rights of students and on the educational en-
vironment in Washington. Following an examination of the Wash-
ington regulatory framework, three areas will be discussed: (1) the
significance of the Washington method of establishing student rights
primarily by administrative rules; (2) the constitutional requirements
of procedural due process in the educational setting; and (3) the effect
of the administrative rules on the doctrine of in loco parentis in Wash-
ington.
I. WASHINGTON FRAMEWORK
In 1971, the Washington Legislature, despite the absence of court
action, enacted the following statute to deal with the due process
rights of Washington public school students:3
The state board of education shall adopt and distribute to all school
districts lawful and reasonable rules and regulations prescribing the
substantive and procedural due process guarantees of pupils in the
common schools.
1. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d
807 (2d Cir. 1967); Lucy v. Adams, 134 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ala. 1955).
2. See generally WASH. AD. CODE ch. 180-40 (1972); Washington State Board of
Education, Commentary: Explanation of the State Board of Education Rules and
Regulations Prescribing the Substantive and Procedural Due Process Guarantees of
Pupils in the Common Schools, Feb. 28, 1972 [hereinafter cited as Commentary].
3. WASH. Rv. CODE § 28A.04.132 (1974). U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, re-
quires: "[No state shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... " Procedural due process generally relates to the mechanism by
which rights are fairly enforced, i.e., notice and hearing, right to cross-examination of
witnesses and the right to counsel. Substantive due process is a somewhat more dif-
ficult concept that bears upon the protections for the individual from governmental
interference. The substantive rights set forth in the Bill of Rights, such as the first
amendment, serve as limitations on the substance of governmental regulation. See
generally E. CoRwIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERMENT (1948).
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Except for the requirements of lawfulness and reasonableness, the leg-
islature did not describe in any detail the student rights to be pro-
tected.
In May 1972, the State Board of Education promulgated rules,4
applicable uniformly to all common school pupils in kindergarten
through grade 125 and to all conduct in school or school-related activ-
ities.6 The rules specify substantive due process rights to be accorded
students and provide in detail the procedural guarantees applicable
when sanctions for rule violations are imposed. 7 Local school boards
retain the power to write their own rules of conduct and to adopt pro-
cedures for imposing minor discipline upon students.8
A. Substantive Rights
The rules accord Washington students substantive rights including
equal educational opportunity without discrimination based on race,
religion, national origin, economic status, sex, pregnancy, marital
status or previous arrest or incarceration. In addition, pupils have the
rights of free speech, assembly and press, the right to petition the gov-
ernment for redress of grievances, the right to be secure from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures and the right to due process of law prior
to the deprivation of any educational opportunity. 9 Finally, the rules
4. WASH. AD. CODE § 180-40-065 (1972). The Board stated that the underlying
concern of the rules was:
[E] ach pupil should clarify his [or her] basic values and develop a commitment
to act upon these values within the framework of his [or her] rights and re-
sponsibilities as a participant in the democratic process.
Id. § 180-40-060.
5. Id. § 180-40-007.
6.
No pupil shall be expelled, suspended or disciplined in any manner for the per-
formance of or failure to perform any act not related to the orderly operation of
the school or school-sponsored activities or any other aspect of the educational
process.
Id. § 180-40-110.
7. Id. § 180-40-085. The rules do not affect residual state and federal constitu-
tional rights. Id. § 180-40-105. This provision is analogous to the ninth amendment
to the United States Constitution which provides: "The enumeration in the Consti-
tution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people." In this fashion, the rights enumerated in the rules cannot be inter-
preted as the only rights open to students. The other rights and protections of the
state and federal constitutions are also available for students.
8. See id. § 180-40-100.
9. Id. §§ 180-40-095(1)-(3). The rights enumerated in this section parallel
those contained in various portions of the federal constitution. See U.S. CoNsT.
amends. I, IV & XIV.
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recognize the educational opportunity provided by the state as a basic
right which cannot be deprived without due process. 10
B. Procedural Rights
The rules specify the authorities responsible for discipline, the pro-
cedure for discipline, the penalties that may be imposed and their ef-
fect on the student's educational credit and record. Three major types
of discipline are authorized: expulsion, suspension and "disciplinary
action." Expulsion, "the denial of the right of school attendance for
an indefinite time period,"." may follow if a student violates the
school district's written rules of conduct and if all other means of se-
curing proper conduct have failed.' 2 Suspension is the denial of the
right to attend school for a period in excess of 3 days, but not more
than two consecutive weeks in the case of elementary students, or 90
days in the case of secondary students.13 Suspension may result if a
student fails to comply with state or local law, the written rules of the
state and district school boards or the reasonable discipline of school
authorities.' 4 Finally, "discipline" is any other form of corrective ac-
tion including, but not limited to, removal from school for a max-
imum of 3 days.15 Any teacher or administrator may discipline a
student for disorderly conduct as long as the punishment is not unrea-
sonable.16
Formal procedures are required for hearings in which suspension or
10. WASH. AD. CODE § 180-40-095(4) (1972).
11. Id. § 180-40-070(1).
12. Id. § 180-40-085. Section § 180-40-115 requires local school districts to estab-
lish rules for readmission of expelled students.
13. In addition, a secondary student may not lose more than one semester's credit
during a school year. Id. §§ 180-40-070(2)a)-(b).
14. Id. § 180-40-080. Only school authorities can suspend a student. Any viola-
tion of state and local law will not constitute grounds for suspension; § 180-40-110
restricts suspension authority to conduct "related to the orderly operation of the
school or school-sponsored activities or any other aspect of the educational process."
15. Id. § 180-40-070(3).
16. Only designated school authorities may take this action. Id. § 180-40-090.
Commentary, supra note 2, indicates that "designated school authorities" for purposes
of this section include teachers, principals or authorities designated by the local
school board. Id. at 1. Although such personnel may remove a student from a
class or all classes for up to 3 days at a time, their authority is restricted such that a
student may not be excluded as a disciplinary measure for more than 6 days in any
one semester nor prevented from accomplishing an academic grade advancement or
graduation requirement. WASH. A. CODE § 180-40-070(3) (1972). The rules also
set a maximum period of 40 minutes for after-school detention. Id. § 180-40-050.
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expulsion is a possible sanction. 17 A student and his or her parents
must be provided advance written notice of the hearing specifying
proposed sanctions and the student's procedural rights.' 8 The student
and/or parents waive the formal procedural rights found in the rules if
they fail to reply in writing within 5 days to the charges of the
school district; they must state whether a hearing will be requested,
whether the pupil will have the representation of counsel and whether
an open or closed hearing will be requested. 19
The student is entitled to a hearing before an impartial decision-
maker who must make written findings of fact and conclusions.20 The
student has access to all relevant written materials and exhibits prior
to the hearing.21 A tape-recorded or verbatim record of the pro-
ceeding must be made by the school district. 22 The pupil is entitled to
be represented by counsel, to present his or her version of the facts
and to introduce evidence and cross-examine witnesses.23
The pupil and/or parents may appeal an adverse decision to the
17. WASH. AD. CODE § 180-40-140.
18. Id. § 180-40-140(2).
19. Id. The waiver provisions may be inadequate to satisfy due process require-
ments. A knowing waiver of the right to a hearing in regular expulsion-suspension
proceedings or emergency proceedings is not well-served by rules which provide
that a failure to respond to a mailed notice from the school district within a few days
constitutes waiver of the procedural rights of the student. A more demanding standard
for waiver to safeguard the procedural rights of the student is required. The United
States Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), defined waiver
as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."
See also Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965) (waiver of a trial by jury must
be in writing with approval of court and consent of prosecutor); Henry v. Mississippi,
379 U.S. 443 (1965) (waiver of objection to illegal evidence by failure to raise the
objection contemporaneously in state court); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973) (waiver of fourth amendment rights); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S.
708 (1948) (strong presumption against waiver of right to counsel). In this regard,
some type of return of the notice by the student or his/her parents indicating whether
the hearing right would be exercised could be employed by the local school board.
Similarly, if personal service of the notice is utilized, a return could also be required
to ensure that the notice reached the affected persons.
The rules fail to specify when, after the occurrence of a rule infraction, the notice
must be sent to the student or his/her parents. Lengthy delays in hearing availability
will subject subsequent disciplinary action to possible court challenge. See note 59
infra.
Finally, the rules neglect to treat situations in which the views of the parents and
the student as to the hearing are in conflict. The student, as the person most directly
affected by the discipline, should have the pre-eminent right to decide whether a
hearing is desired.
20. WASH. AD. CODE § 180-40-140(1) (1972).
21. Id. § 180-40-140(3).
22. Id. § 180-40-140(4).
23. Id. § 180-40-140(3). Washington allows a student to be represented by counsel
but does not require the appointment of counsel. The cases involving a right to
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local school board within five school days of the hearing. 24 The local
board ruling, in turn, can be appealed within 30 days to the superior
court in the county in which the school district is located. 25
In situations involving emergencies or minor sanctions, these proce-
dural requirements are abandoned for speedier and less formal
methods. In emergency situations where the district superintendent or
his or her designee reasonably determines that a pupil is a danger to
him or herself, other pupils, the staff or the educational process, the
pupil may be suspended without a hearing for a period not to exceed
10 school days.26 There is a substantial threat of abuse of this interim
suspension power by school authorities: they determine, subject only
to the requirement of reasonableness, (1) whether an emergency exists
and (2) whether the student constitutes a danger to the parties listed.27
Danger is undefined, apparently involving some unspecified harm to
persons or "the educational process. '2 8
Local school boards are encouraged to develop their own discipli-
nary measures at a level short of "disciplinary action," e.g., short sus-
pensions or classroom corrective actions, and are permitted to create
advisory boards composed of students, parents, teachers and adminis-
trators. Such boards are empowered to prescribe limited, reasonable
counsel for indigents in criminal cases may be persuasive in compelling the appoint-
ment of counsel for indigent students in school disciplinary proceedings in Washing-
ton. In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the United States Supreme
Court held that an indigent must be provided with counsel in felony cases. Similarly,
in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), the Court held that an indigent must
be provided with counsel in misdemeanor cases in which imprisonment is a possible
sanction. But see Madera v. Board of Education, 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), in
which the court held that a pupil suspended by a principal and not represented by
counsel at a subsequent guidance conference was not deprived of due process rights.
The right to counsel for indigent students in disciplinary proceedings is justifiable
on policy grounds. Disciplinary proceedings take on characteristics of criminal pro-
ceedings in that sanctions are imposed on individuals, and the equal protection
analysis of the criminal right to counsel cases may therefore be applicable: Once the
right to counsel is generally available to pupils, indigent students or parents cannot
be deprived of the protection of counsel. Frequently, indigency is related to lack of
education; uneducated, poor people may be unable to present an adequate defense
for their children and counsel may be essential for the articulation of a case for a
child in the disciplinary process. Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, supra; Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972); In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).
24. WASH. AD. CODE § 180-40-140(5) (1972).
25. Id. § 180-40-155.
26. Id. §8 180-40-130(1)--(2) (1972). A hearing must be scheduled within
3 school days of a request by the suspended student. Id. § 180-40-130(2). Waiver of
this right is discussed at note 19 supra.
27. Id. § 180-40-130(1). See note 68 infra.
28. See WASH. AD. CODE § 180-40-130(1) (1972).
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punishment and recommend suspension or expulsion in individual
cases, although the local school boards can set aside or modify their
decisions.29 The rules also create an informal conference procedure
which may be initiated by an aggrieved person subsequent to a disci-
plinary action other than suspension or expulsion. 30
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WASHINGTON SYSTEM
A. Washington Method of Adoption of Due Process Rules for Public
School Students
Washington's choice to adopt due process rules for public school
students by means of a broad statute and specific administrative rules is
advantageous in several ways. First, the rules establish the general out-
line of the disciplinary process and thereby reduce the disparities in
student rights enjoyed among districts and avoid the uncertainties of
extensive litigation in this sensitive area.
Second, by relying on administrative rules promulgated by the State
Board of Education, the legislature utilized the Board's expertise and
its access to educational and legal advice. This administrative process
encourages close cooperation and consultation between educational
and legal authorities; administrative rulemaking serves to produce
rules that are suitable and enforceable in the educational setting and
that satisfy judicial concepts of due process under the fourteenth
amendment. Pursuant to its statutory authority, 31 the Board held sec-
tional meetings throughout the state to gain the insight and experience
of educators and school administrators in the school disciplinary
process prior to adopting the present rules. 32
Third, the Washington scheme also permits local school boards to
participate in the establishment of due process rules for public school
students by authorizing local boards to adopt limited disciplinary rules
and general rules of conduct for the schools of their area.33 Local
29. Id. § 180-40-120; Commentary, supra note 2, at 3.
30. Id. § 180-40-125. The informal conference procedure permits parents or
students to question the school authority in charge of the procedure and also allows
them to make a formal protest to the local school board.
3 1. See note 2 supra.
32. Letter from Llewllyn 0. Griffith, Consultant, Administrative Services, Office of
the Superintendent of Public Instruction, to author, Sept. 5, 1974, on file with Wash-
ington Law Review.
33. Local school boards are encouraged to limit the discretion of educational
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boards' knowledge of local conditions is utilized and the tradition of
local control of school-related activities is preserved within the frame-
work of statewide rules.
Finally, the fact that the State Board of Education promulgated
concrete rules has lent legitimacy to student rights and should prompt
strict compliance among the state's educational personnel.34
Some jurisdictions, Oregon for example,35 have joined Washington
in providing due process to public school students by means of a
broad statute and specific administrative rules. Elsewhere, four other
methods of achieving due process safeguards for students have
emerged.
B. Other Methods
1. Statutory due process schemes
A number of states have adopted procedural and substantive due
process rights for students by statute. To guard against statutes so
general that court intervention to clarify them is necessary,36 these stat-
utory schemes should include, at a minimum, procedures by which
the school may discipline unruly or disruptive students. Simultane-
ously, the statutory schemes should provide for local action as Wash-
ington has done in its rulemaking approach. California is an example
of a state satisfying due process by explicit statutory safeguards,37
personnel by adopting written regulations more extensive than those mandated by the
State Board. WASH. AD. CODE § 180-40-065 (1972); Commentary, supra note 2, at 3.
They may "make reasonable rules and regulations bearing a real and substantial
relationship to the direct preservation of their own, their fellow pupils' or the public's
health and safety or for the maintenance of the educational process." WASH. AD. CODE §
180-40-100 (1972).
34. Cf. note 68 infra. New York City's example is illustrative of the need for pro-
fessional respect for the rules. See Glaser & Levine, Bringing Student Rights to New
York City's School System, I J. LAw & EDUc. 213,227-29 (1972).
35. ORE. REv. STAT. § 339.240 (1971). See also S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN.§ 13-32-4 (1973).
36. See note 38 infra. See also Smith v. Miller, 213 Kan. 1, 514 P.2d 377 (1973).
37. See CAL. EDUC. CODE 88 10601-10611 (West 1975). For example, the Cali-
fornia statutes provide for suspension by teacher for good cause for a limited time
period (1 day) upon report to the principal. A parent-teacher conference must follow.
The statutes define good cause, id. § 10601.6; establish the grounds for suspension,
id. § 10602; set the duration of suspension, id. § 10607; provide for notification of
disciplinary proceedings to the student's parents, id. § 10607.8; allow the student to
appeal the decision of the local board to a county board of education, id. § 10608;
and provide for free expression by students, id. § 10611.
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while Arizona has only enacted a very general statutory system that
has already required judicial clarification. 38
The legislative approach to due process rules for students may re-
sult in rules which fail to respond to the needs of participants in the
educational disciplinary process. While the education committees of
the legislature may have expertise in the constitutional requirements
of due process in the public schools, the legislature itself may lack
familiarity with the educational and disciplinary setting and may
enact statutes that result in rules so inflexible that the experience and
requirements of different types of local school districts are not con-
sidered. In addition, inadequate attention to local views may build
resentment among educational pesonnel, resentment manifested in
opposition to or frustration of the rules. 39 The rulemaking process
adopted in Washington is more flexible and attentive to the indepen-
dent authority and expertise of local school boards in the discipline of
pupils.
2. Statutes requiring local action
Some jurisdictions, in particular Montana, 40 have delegated to local
school boards the responsibility to define the authorities and proce-
dures under which school discipline is administered. Local boards
may consider local conditions such as population density, costs, de-
gree of urbanization and student needs in determining the scope of
due process rights for students. Such a system risks disparities in stu-
dent rights among districts and may result in the violation of student
rights when a local board inadequately provides for substantive or
procedural guarantees. A further complication is that smaller school
38. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 15-204,-442 (1971) are the sole statutory provisions in
Arizona concerning student due process rights. Id. § 15-204 provides only that
educational authorities may suspend for good cause upon report within 5 days to the
local school board; § 15-442 provides simply that a school board may expel a
student for misconduct. In Kelly v. Martin, 16 Ariz. App. 7, 490 P.2d 836 (1971),
the court upheld the constiutionality of Arizona's general expulsion statute but found
it necessary to stipulate that notice and hearing, right to counsel and the right to cross-
examine witnesses must be provided prior to expulsion.
39. See note 68 infra.
40. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 75-6311 (1971) provides:
The trustees of the district shall adopt a policy defining the authority and pro-
cedure to be used by a teacher, superintendent or principal in suspending a pupil
and to define the circumstances and procedures by which the trustees may expel
a pupil. Expulsion shall be a disciplinary action available only to the trustees.
See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-221 (1949).
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districts may simply choose to forego the added expense of adminis-
tering rules that confer rights upon students.41
3. Court-mandated rules formulated and adopted by local educational
systems
In response to litigation challenging state laws or particular discipli-
nary actions, some courts have compelled local school boards to
adopt rules that provide substantive and procedural due process.42
Although the factors of compulsion and haste may affect the quality
of regulations thus engendered, the courts recognize local values by
this method of deferring to local judgment:43
School administrators are free to adopt regulations providing for fair
suspension procedures which are consonant with the educational goals
of their schools and locality. There is no one way to insure fairness in
the suspension process. The choice of the best procedures for a partic-
ular school system should be left to the school officials charged with
the administration of that school system.
4. Systemic changes formulated and ordered by the courts
A final method of adopting due process guarantees to public school
students is for the court itself to prescribe specific rules and regula-
tions. For example, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri adopted minimal substantive and procedural
41. See letter from Gary M. Little, General Counsel for Seattle Public Schools, to
author, Sept. 4, 1974, on file with Washington Law Review. Mr. Little commented:
It is my opinion that the rules serve a valuable purpose in protecting the rights
of students, but I feel that they are probably not enforced in many school dis-
tricts, and indeed to do so in some of the smaller school districts would be a
burden.
42. See, e.g., Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202 (W.D.N.C. 1972) (local school
board compelled to promulgate procedural rules for students); Graham v. Knutsen,
351 F. Supp. 642 (D. Neb. 1972), aff'd on rehearing, 362 F. Supp. 881 (D. Neb.
1973) (local school system ordered to adopt substantive and procedural rules).
43. Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279, 1302 (S.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd sub nom.
Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975). In Lopez, the appellee students' class action
was successful in challenging their summary suspensions by a principal for 10 days.
Local school boards may not only be compelled to adopt rules conforming to due
process requirements, but may also be subject to damages or injunctions, as provided
in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The Supreme Court held explicitly in Wood v. Strick-
land, 95 S. Ct. 992 (1975), that school board members could be liable for damages
to students who can demonstrate that their constitutional rights were intentionally
violated by school action.
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guidelines for pending student discipline cases. 44 No code of conduct
was adopted, 45 but procedural safeguards including notice, hearing
and decision based on substantial evidence were required of school
systems in cases of expulsion or lengthy suspension. Similarly, in Mills
v. Board of Education,46 the Federal District Court for the District of
Columbia ordered the immediate adoption of procedural and substan-
tive due process rules developed by the court in close consultation
with the parties to the action contesting school disciplinary procedures
and the treatment of handicapped students.
The court order approach is subject to the criticism that the courts
are intruding in an area in which they possess little expertise; courts
certainly understand the scope of procedural and substantive due
process rights, but lack intimate knowledge about the educational set-
ting. Court orders may fail to consider the need for less formal rules
in certain aspects of educational discipline. In addition, courts are
theoretically restricted by the judicial process to orders affecting the
parties to the litigation. 47 Rules and regulations of regional and state-
wide application may have to await class action litigation. 48 The pos-
44. General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review
of Student Discipline in Tax-Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D.
133 (1968).
45. In fashioning the order, the court utilized briefs and arguments from civil liber-
ties, governmental and student organizations concerned about procedural due process
rights for students. Id.
46. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
47. For an examination of the theoretical basis of the common law system that
limits judicial action to the parties before the court, see B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1960). More
complicated forms of action such as the class action have made possible judicial orders
affecting greater numbers of individuals.
48. Class action litigation, i.e., a suit by a person or persons as representatives of
a larger class of individuals with a shared interest, is possible under FED. R. CIV. PRO.
23 and its Washington procedural counterpart, WASH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 23. A sig-
nificant number of the school discipline cases have been brought as class actions. For
example, in Fujishima v. Board of Education, 460 F.2d 1355, 1360 (7th Cir. 1972),
the court held that three students challenging a district rule on campus distribution of
literature met the test of a class action:
Here the requirements of Rule 23(a) are satisfied because the number of Chicago
high school students makes joinder impracticable, the question of law is common
to the class, the claims of plaintiffs are typical of the class and plaintiffs have
fairly and adequately protected the interests of the class.
Not all courts, however, are as willing to permit students to bring class actions. In
Fielder v. Board of Education, 346 F. Supp. 722, 727 (D. Neb. 1972), the court held
that student plaintiffs failed to adequately define the class affected and that five ex-
pelled students who constituted the class were not so numerous as to make joinder
impracticable. Fielder and similar cases indicate that strict judicial examination of
the class may limit the usefulness of the class action as a means of securing regional
or statewide rules.
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sibility that educational personnel may resist and resent due process
rules for students created by court order is also present. 49
C. Variations in Procedural Due Process
The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion protect a person from the denial of life, liberty or property by the
federal and state governments without due process of law.50 Due
process is a flexible concept involving a balancing of governmental
and individual interests.51 In his concurring opinion in Joint Anti-
Fascist Committee v. McGrath, Justice Frankfurter suggested criteria
for fixing the scope of procedural due process in individual cases:52
The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the
manner in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available
alternatives to the procedure that was followed, the protection implicit
in the office of the functionary whose conduct is challenged, the bal-
ance of hurt complained of and good accomplished-these are some
of the considerations that must enter into the judicial judgment.
More recently, in Goss v. Lopez,53 a case involving the summary sus-
pension of Ohio public school students for 10 days, the United States
49. See text accompanying note 68 infra.
50. U.S. CoNsT. amends. V, XIV.
51. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
895 (1961); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); Madera v. Board of Education,
386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967). See generally Buss, Procedural Due Process for School
Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 545 (1971). In
the following cases, the Court required at least the minimal due process rights of
notice and hearing: Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (garnish-
ment of wages); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (deprivation of welfare
benefits); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (deprivation of a driver's license);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (deprivation of children from putative father);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (replevin of property); see Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation); Wolff v. McDonnell, 416 U.S. 966
(1974) (prison disciplinary proceedings at which loss of "good time" is threatened).
In Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 930 (1961), one of the earliest student due process cases, the Supreme Court
refused to disturb the circuit court decision which held that before students may be
expelled from a state university they must be provided with the due process safe-
guards of notice of, and an opportunity to respond to, the allegations constituting
grounds for dismissal.
52. 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951). In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970),
Justice Brennan suggests, however- "The opportunity to be heard must be tailored to
the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard."
53. 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975). In a vigorous dissent, Justice Powell, joined by the
Chief Justice and Justices Rehnquist and Blackmun maintained that the majority
opinion will result in unprecedented judicial intrusion into the educational process.
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Supreme Court held that students are entitled to due process in disci-
plinary proceedings resulting in suspension. The Court indicated that
before a student may be suspended, school authorities must provide to
students:
(1) oral or written notice of the charges;
(2) explanation of the evidence possessed by the authorities; and
(3) opportunity to defend against the charges in a hearing.
Two essential features of any due process analysis in the educational
setting are the type of discipline inflicted and the age or educational
attainment of the student.
1. Type of discipline
In the past, courts did not recognize a federal constitutional right to
education,54 but found that access to public education which the state
He suggested that the majority had misread the requirements of due process par-
ticularly since the 10-day suspension at issue had merely a de minimis effect on a
student's educational interest. He forecast that the Court will face an unending num-
ber of educational administration problems; the Court, he stated, should not have
upheld the lower court decision requiring notice and hearing in school disciplinary
matters because the entire problem is beyond the ability of the Court, because
teachers do not need undue judicial interference in their traditional role, and because
Ohio procedures for more serious deprivations such as expulsion were constitutionally
adequate. Id. at 742 n.4.
It is difficult to understand the fears of the dissenters when the Washington system
is compared to the requirements of due process set forth in the majority opinion.
Washington certainly has more extensive procedural protections for students. In a
letter to the author, supra note 41, Gary M. Little, General Counsel for Seattle Public
Schools, indicated that there are over 100 hearings per school year in Seattle alone
under the Washington rules. The school system does not appear overburdened by
these procedural rules and a case involving student due process under these rules has
never even reached the appellate courts of this state.
54. In San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1972),
Justice Powell stated for the majority:
Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under
our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so
protected. As we have said, the undisputed importance of education will not alone
cause this court to depart from the usual standard for reviewing a state's social
and economic legislation.
In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954), however, the Court
noted that education is essential to success in modern life:
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to suc-
ceed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity,
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms.
See also Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.). cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961); Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd
sub nom. Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975); Betts v. Board of Educ., 466 F.2d
629 (7th Cir. 1972); Vail v. Board of Educ., 354 F. Supp. 592 (D.N.H. 1973);
DeJesus v. Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70 (D. Conn. 1972).
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chose to offer constituted such a significant and desirable feature of
American society that it was a property interest that could not be
impaired without due process of law. Where the state constitution
guaranteed a student's right to an education, or the state constitution
or statutes required school attendance, courts were even more willing
to find that a student's interest in a continuted education was "prop-
erty" or "liberty" so as to merit protection under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.5 5 In Goss v. Lopez,5 6 the United
States Supreme Court adopted this reasoning and held that because
Ohio chose to extend "the right to an education to people of appellees'
class generally, Ohio may not withdraw that right on grounds of mis-
conduct absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether
the misconduct has occurred. .... . 57
The scope of the procedural protections available to a student who
has been disciplined or faces disciplinary action varies with the seri-
ousness of the proposed sanction. Where the punishment involved is
expulsion, i.e. exclusion of students from school attendance for an
indefinite period of time, courts have not hesitated to require formal
hearings with substantial procedural guarantees. 58
Where the punishment is suspension, i.e. exclusion from school for
a limited period, earlier courts disagreed upon how many days of sus-
pension were required before due process rights arose.59 In Pervis v.
LaMarque Independent School District60 and Murray v. West Baton
55. Constitutional or statutory provisions of this type make school attendance a
substantive right granted by the state to all citizens and, absent due process of law,
that right cannot be deprived by state action. See, e.g., Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp.
202 (W.D.N.C. 1972), in which the court held that exclusion of students from school
without hearings violated procedural due process particularly because school at-
tendance was required by the state constitution.
56. 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975).
57. Id. at 736.
58. See generally Strickland v. Board of Education, 20 Cal. App. 3d 83, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 422 (lst Dist. Ct. App. 1971), appeal denied, 405 U.S. 1005 (1971); Boone,
Expulsion in California Public High Schools-Due Process a Decade After Dixon, 8
SAN DIEGo L. REv. 333 (1971). Contra, Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir.
1967).
59. Compare Fielder v. Board of Education, 346 F. Supp. 722 (D. Neb.- 1972)
(denial of a full hearing until 30 days after- expulsion denied students due process)
with Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1971) (10-day suspension without a hearing
did not violate due process) and Jackson v. Hepinstall, 328 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D.N.Y.
1971) (5-day suspension without a hearing upheld) and Linwood v. Board of Educa-
cation, 463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972) (7-day suspen-
sion without hearing approved). The justifications offered by the courts for such dis-
parities in treatment of suspensions are not clear.
60. 466 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1972).
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Rouge Parish School Board,6' the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated that a hearing was essential to students suspended for 3 months
and a potentially unlimited period, respectively. In contrast, the
United States District Court for the Central District of California held
in Baker v. Downey City Board of Education62 that two students sus-
pended for 10 days and removed from student offices were not denied
due process of law even though they were not afforded hearings on
guilt prior to the imposition of the penalties.
The Supreme Court decision in Goss that students cannot be sum-
marily suspended from school for 10 days without a hearing and no-
tice of the charges against them clarifies this dilemma significantly. At
a minimum, due process requirements attach for suspensions of 10
days duration: 63
A short suspension is of course a far milder deprivation than expul-
sion. But, "education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments," and the total exclusion from the educational
process for more than a trivial period, and certainly if the suspension
is for 10 days, is a serious event in the life of the suspended child. Nei-
ther the property interest in educational benefits temporarily denied
nor the liberty interest in reputation, which is also implicated, is so
insubstantial that suspensions may constitutionally be imposed by any
procedure the school chooses, no matter how arbitrary.
The Washington rules provide for a single type of proceeding in
both expulsion and suspension cases. Nonetheless, suspension is de-
fined as exclusion from school for more than three days, and the rules
still permit a student to be removed from attendance for periods of
three days or less without the full, formal hearing under the "disci-
pline" provision.64 Presumably, the distinction between "suspension"
and shorter exclusions from school relieves local boards and the
courts of the difficult issue of deciding at what precise number of days
a suspended student must be accorded full due process safeguards.
61. 472 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973).
62. 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
63. 95 S. Ct. at 737 (citation omitted). By implication, as the dissenters suggest.
see note 66 infra, the reasoning of the majority could apply to suspensions of even
shorter periods: A suspension of a single day could be a serious event in the life of a
child and the property and liberty interests of the child that the majority found present
in a 10-day suspension would be equally present at the shorter suspension.
64. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
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The distinction, however, does not clearly resolve the constitutional
issue. A 3-day suspension does not differ in any meaningful fashion
from a 4-day suspension, but greater procedural safeguards are avail-
able to the Washington student in the event of imposition of the latter
punishment. In both instances, the right to attend school is adversely
affected. 65 A more conceptually sound rule, one that would avoid the
rather unproductive court inquiry into the point at which due process
rights arise, would require that where the right to attend school is af-
fected in any fashion, regardless of the duration of the suspension, the
procedures outlined in W.A.C. § 180-40--140 should apply; i.e., any
suspension of 1 day or longer should merit an appropriate hearing. 66
The Washington rules also recognize that there are emergency situ-
ations in which immediate suspension of students, pending a later
hearing, is permitted.67 Although there is potential for abuse of this
rule by school administrators who define the emergency and charac-
terize particular student behavior as dangerous, 68 the rule appears. to
be constitutionally valid. For example, in Black Coalition v. Portland
65. Washington guarantees citizens the right to education, see WASH. CONST. art.
IX, §§ 1 & 2, and compels school attendance. WASH. REv. CODE § 28A.27.010 (1974).
See also WASH. AD. CODE § 180-40-075 (1972) (attendance rights and responsibili-
ties). WASH. CONsT. art. IX, § 1, in fact states:
It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education
of all children residing within its borders, without distinction or preference on
account of race, color, caste, or sex.
Id. § 2 adds inter alia:
The legislature shall provide for a general and uniform system of public schools.
The public school system shall include common schools, and such high schools,
normal schools, and technical schools as may hereafter be established.
66. This is substantially the effect envisioned by the dissent in Goss:
It justifies this unprecendented intrusion into the process of elementary and secon-
dary education by identifying a new constitutional right: the right of a student
not to be suspended for as much as a single day without notice and a due process
hearing either before or promptly following the suspension.
95 S. Ct. at 741. For the majority view that prompted this statement, see text accom-
panying note 63 supra.
67. See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
68. See text accompanying note 26 supra; Glaser & Levine, Bringing Student Rights
to New York City's School System, I J. LAW & EDuc. 213 (1972). The authors note
that in New York City schools, educators forcefully resisted the imposition of student
rights legislation upon the city schools. Administrators either ignored the rules entirely
or defined disciplinary action under the emergency procedures. A 1971 study by the
New York Civil Liberties Union found that in 77% of the suspension cases studied, no
emergency existed and students were expelled -for reasons such as truancy, tardiness or
chewing gum. Notice was frequently inadequate, and hearings were frequently delayed
or not held at all. In 20% of the cases, parents never received notification of the sus-
pension or the hearing. The suspensions were for longer periods than allowed by
statute and reasons for the suspensions were seldom detailed. Id. at 225-26.
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School District No. 1,69 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
interim suspension of students allegedly guilty of assaults on fellow
students on the grounds that their continued presence in class would
not be conducive to the educational environment and that hearings
would be available soon after the suspensions.
An additional form of discipline is not addressed in the Washington
rules. Although Washington has procedures pertaining to the transfer
and reclassification of handicapped students, 70 disciplinary reclassifi-
cations and transfers of nonhandicapped students, items which merit
specific rules and procedures, are not treated. Often, transfer to a dif-
ferent type of school or educational program adversely affects the stu-
dent by stigmatizing the child as a "discipline problem" requiring unu-
sual supervision.71 Failure of the Washington rules to consider this
area will likely result in litigation to determine the applicability of the
69. 484 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1973). Emergency suspension procedures were also
upheld in Black Students v. Williams, 470 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972) and Wise v.
Savers, 345 F. Supp. 90 (E. D. Pa. 1972).
70. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.27.010 (1974) (attendance exemption for the
handicapped); § 28A.13.060 (appeal from local board exclusions); §§ 28A.13.070(6)-
(7) (authority to Superintendent of Public Instruction to hear appeals and to
establish substantive and procedural rules); WASH. AD. CODE § 392-45 (1972)
(classification system); id. § 392-45-185 (procedural rules for handicapped students).
Handicapped children are defined as:
those children in school or out of school who are temporarily or permanently
retarded in normal educational processes by reason of physical or mental handi-
cap, or by reason of social or emotional maladjustment, or by reason of other
handicap, and those children who have specific learning and language disabilities
resulting from perceptual-motor handicaps, including problems in visual and
auditory perception and integration.
WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.13.010 (1974).
71. Expulsion, suspension, reassignment or transfer of children labeled "behavioral
problems, mentally retarded, emotionally disturbed, or hyperactive" without a hearing
has been held violative of due process:
Not only are plaintiffs and their class denied the publicly supported education to
which they are entitled [,J many are suspended or expelled from regular schooling
or specialized instruction or reassigned without any prior hearing and are given
no periodic review thereafter. Due process of law requires a hearing prior to ex-
clu'ion, termination [or] classification into a special program.
Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C. 1972). But see Hunt v.
Wilson, 72 Misc. 2d 360, 339 N.Y.S.2d 287 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (in which the court up-
held the suspension and reassignment of students without a hearing to a tutoring cen-
ter which was deficient in educational facilities). The stigma associated with school dis-
cipline has been considered by some courts. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Houston Independent
School Dist., 333 F. Supp. 1149, 1171-73, (S.D. Tex. 1971); Breen v. Kahl, 296 F.
Supp. 702, 707 (W.D. Wis.), affd, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 937 (1970). See also Ladd, Allegedly Disruptive Student Behavior and the
Legal Authority of School Officials, 19 J. PUB. LAW 209, 218-29 (1970).
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various procedural guarantees to such transfer and reclassification
cases.
72
The Washington rules likewise fail to outline a procedure by which
corporal punishment may be administered. Corporal punishment is
more fully treated in Part II-D infra.
2. Age or educational level
The Washington rules have eliminated the distinctions in proce-
dural safeguards based on the age or educational level of students.
The extensive procedural protections are applicable uniformly to all
common school students from kindergarten through grade 12.73 Sup-
porters of the view that due process rights should vary by age or edu-
cational level base their view upon the assumptions that younger chil-
dren are entitled to fewer rights and that, impliedly, younger children
do not need due process protections at all.74 Children should not have
constitutional rights intended for adults, as the dissent in Goss sug-
gests: "[T] he Court ignores the expertise of mankind, as well as the
long history of our law, recognizing that there are differences which
must be accommodated in determining the rights and duties of children
as compared with those of adults. '75 In contrast to the limited regard
72. See, e.g., Webster v. Perry, 367 F. Supp. 666 (W.D.N.C. 1973) (challenge to
the constitutionality of a North Carolina statute which permitted school officials to
classify certain students as uneducable and expel them); Hunt v. Wilson, 72 Misc. 2d
360, 339 N.Y.S.2d 287 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (challenge to suspension and reassignment of
students without a hearing to a tutoring center which was deficient in educational fa-
cilities).
73. WASH. AD. CODE § 180-40-007 (1972).
74. Courts have been quite forthright in distinguishing between the rights of col-
lege students and high school students. For example, in Boyd v. Smith, 353 F. Supp.
844, 848 (N.D. Ind. 1973), the court stated:
[T] he Seventh Circuit has emphasized that "greater flexibility may be permissi-
ble in regulations governing high school students than college codes of conduct
because of the different characteristics of the educational institutions, the dif-
ferences in the range of activities subject to discipline, and the age of the students."
See also Wright, The Constitution on Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027 (1969); Com-
ment, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HARv. L. REV. 1406 (1957). Similarly,
courts have attempted to disparage due process rights for students by comparing col-
lege students to very young children:
It is obvious that the means utilized to determine the necessity for suspension from
a campus of a college student may and should be quite different from those used
by a principal in deciding whether to spank a grade school youngster.
Glaser v. Marietta, 351 F. Supp. 555, 558 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
75. 95 S. Ct. at 744 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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for due process challenges by younger children evidenced by the dis-
sent in Goss, the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
School District76 implicitly recognized that the age of the student in a
disciplinary setting is not a crucial factor for the exercise of constitu-
tional rights when it upheld on-campus symbolic political expression
by children of various ages. Such an outlook is also apparent in the
Court's treatment of procedural rights for disciplined students in
Goss.77
The Washington rules have, in effect, extended these Court rulings
to the exercise of a broad range of rights by children of all ages in the
common schools. The rules represent recognition of the fact that
younger children, who may not be able to comprehend the effects or
purposes of punishment and who may not be able to respond effec-
tively to disciplinary action alone,78 may need the protection of due
process rights to safeguard a precious educational interest as much as
or more than older students.79
D. In Loco Parentis and Corporal Punishment
The doctrine of in loco parentis8" has been utilized in many Amer-
76. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The logic of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), that the
fourteenth amendment is available to protect the constitutional rights of minors in the
juvenile court system, is also applicable. See note 96 infra.
77. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
78. It has been suggested that the stigma of school-related discipline is particularly
unhealthy where the grounds for disciplinary action are poorly articulated and the
official school attitude toward students is an autocratic one. Ladd, Allegedly Disruptive
Student Behavior and the Legal Authority of School Officials, 19 J. PUB. LAw 209
(1970).
79. In support of a reversal of the traditional approach to varying due process
standards for students of different educational levels, it has been suggested that:
(1) public school attendance is a more valuable interest than is university attendance
and as such should receive greater protection;
(2) a college student is more capable of making his or her own defense and is there-
fore in less need of counsel than is a public school student; and
(3) public school children are often inarticulate and unable to make a defense for
themselves which further supports the proposition that public school children should
have counsel in the disciplinary process.
Note, Due Process Does Not Require That a Student Be Afforded the Right to Coun-
sel at a Public School Suspension Hearing, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 342, 351-52 n.63
(1968).
80. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 896 (4th ed. 1968) defines in loco parentis: "In the
place of a parent; instead of a parent; charged, fictitiously with a parent's rights, duties,
and responsibilities." See I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453:
He may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor
or school master of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has such a portion
of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz., that of restraint and cor-
rection, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed.
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ican jurisdictions81 to justify82 the infliction of corporal punishment83
upon students:84
The teacher's authority is analogous to that which belongs to parents,
and the authority of the teacher is regarded as a delegation of parental
authority. One of the most sacred duties of parents, is to train up and
qualify their children, for becoming useful and virtuous members of
society; this duty cannot be effectually performed without the ability
to command obedience, to control stubborness, to quicken diligence,
and to reform bad habits; the power to administer moderate correc-
tion, when he [or she] shall believe it to be just and necessary. The
teacher is the substitute of the parent; is charged in part with the per-
formance of [parental] duties and in the exercise of these delegated
duties, is invested with [parental] power.
Thus, corporal punishment has been tolerated as a proper educational
method so long as it is reasonably employed for educational objectives85
These definitions appear to encompass the traditional common law view of the doc-
trine. See State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365 (1837).
81. See, e.g., Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449, 71 So. 2d 49 (1954) (a teacher stands
in loco parentis and has authority to administer moderate corporal punishment); Mar-
tar v. Bill, 181 Tenn. 100, 178 S.W.2d 634 (1944) (teacher stands in loco parentis to
children and may administer corporal punishment, if without malice or excess, for the
good of the child); Sheehan v. Sturges, 53 Conn. 481, 2 A. 841 (1885) (teacher must
consider the nature of the offense, age, size, sex and apparent powers of endurance of
the pupil in administering corporal punishment); Cooper v. McJunkin, 4 Ind. 290
(1853) (teacher held liable for assault where child was bruised and cut in the face by
corporal punishment).
82. There are two other potential justifications for corporal punishment of students:
(1) implied or express consent of the child or parent to the discipline; and (2) statu-
tory provisions. Note, Right of a Teacher to Administer Corporal Punishment to a
Student, 5 WASHBURtN LJ. 75 (1965). However, each of these rationales for corporal
punishment rests upon a similar theoretical basis, i.e., that the student, without his or
her personal consent, is subjected to physical discipline from school authorities acting
in the manner of or under the authority of parents or public bodies. Consent of the
child when given under duress does not detract from the discretion of the educator
administering the punishment. Comment, The Birch Rod, Due Process, and the Disci-
plinarian, 26 ARK. L. REv. 365 (1972).
83. This note will treat corporal punishment as any type of physical punishment
used by teachers, administrators or other school personnel in the disciplining of pupils.
84. State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365 (1837).
85. Presently, only New Jersey confines the use of corporal punishment by statute
to a narrow range of exceptional circumstances. See Comment, The Birch Rod, Due
Process, and the Disciplinarian, 26 ARK. L. REv. 365, 374 (1972). An educator may
use "reasonable and necessary" force in the following situations:
(1) to quell a disturbance, threatening physical injury to others;
(2) to obtain possession of weapons or other dangerous objects upon the person or
within the control of a pupil;
(3) to defend one's self; and
(4) to protect other persons or property.
N. J. STAT. ArN. § 18A:6-1 (1964).
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such as corrections for rule violations in the classroom or self-pro-
tection of teachers. 86
The Washington Supreme Court has considered in loco parentis
only tangentially in school tort cases, but it has accepted the tradi-
tional view of that doctrine. 87 More importantly, Washington's cor-
poral punishment statute, 88 still in effect although it predates the
adoption of the State Board of Education rules, embodies an in loco
parentis approach to defining the permissible scope of authority for
school officials over students. Students are required to obey the rules
and regulations of the schools and respect the authority of teachers. 89
Certified personnel may utilize corporal punishment to restrain or cor-
rect children if such discipline is reasonable and moderate9" and is
administered in the presence of other certified personnel.91
The Washington corporal punishment provisions are subject to chal-
lenge on several grounds. First, they are unduly vague; they fail to
provide guidance to teachers as to when corporal punishment may be
applied or to establish student safeguards against arbitrary physical
punishment. The standards "reasonable and moderate" or "excessive
and unreasonable" lack content, and no case law exists to explain
these terms.
86. See, e.g., Ware v. Estes, 458 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1972) (corporal punishment
by school officials without or contrary to parental permission; one plaintiff knocked
unconscious by an assistant principal when he directed an obscenity at that administra-
tor); Gonyaw v. Gray, 361 F. Supp. 366 (D. Vt. 1973) (challenge to corporal punish-
ment by 12-year-old who was punished with a belt for having admitted to sending a
"dirty" note to a classmate and by a student who was allegedly struck across the face
by a math teacher when he questioned a disciplinary decision); Sims v. Board of Edu-
cation, 329 F. Supp. 678 (D.N.M. 1971) (corporal punishment for possession of a
template taken from a crafts class in violation of district rules); Simms v. School Dis-
trict, 13 Ore. App. 119, 508 P.2d 236 (1973) (teacher used physical force to eject a
violent and disruptive student with poor behavior record from the class). The courts
upheld the corporal punishment in each instance finding that reasonable corporal pun-
ishment regulations did not violate any constitutional rights.
87. See, e.g., Briscoe v. School Dist. No. 123, 32 Wn. 2d 353, 362, 201 P.2d 697,
701 (1949); MacLeod v. Grant County School Dist., 42 Wn. 2d 316, 253 P.2d 360
(1953); Swartley v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 70 Wn. 2d 17, 421 P.2d 1009 (1966);
Chapman v. State, 6 Wn. App. 316, 492 P.2d 607 (1972).
88. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.11.040(4) (1974) exempts teachers and school personnel
from assault liability where they administer reasonable and moderate corporal punish-
ment.
89. WASH. AD. CODE § 180-40-080 (1972).
90. See note 88 supra. See also Ware v. Estes, 458 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1972);
Gonyaw v. Gray, 361 F. Supp. 566 (D. Vt. 1973). See generally RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 152 (1965); Note, In Loco Parentis: Definition, Application, and
Implication, 23 S.C.L. REV. 114 (1971); Note, Discipline by Teachers in Loco Paren-
tis, 6 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 313 (1957).
91. WASH. AD. CODE § 180-44-020(1) (1965). Abuse of a child by excessive or
unreasonable- punishment is a misdemeanor. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.87.140 (1974).
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Second, the doctrine of in loco parentis, resting on the notion that
pupils possess few rights independent of their parents and that those
rights are surrendered at the schoolhouse door, is undermined both by
the rules promulgated by the State Board of Education and decisions
of the United States Supreme Court. The Board rules clearly express a
state policy to limit the discretion of school officials in the educational
disciplinary process. The corporal punishment statutes appear to vio-
late the spirit and underlying rationale of the rules both as to sub-
stance and procedure.92 Corporal punishment has been challenged on
due process and eighth amendment93 grounds in other jurisdictions
with little success. 94 However, the clarity of the policy underlying the
Washington rules, to remove discipline from the discretion of school
authorities and place it within the framework of legally enforceable
rules,95 indicates that a student challenge to corporal punishment on
due process grounds may be on stronger footing in this jurisdiction.
The doctrine of in loco parentis also conflicts with Supreme Court
decisions holding that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the
Bill of Rights is for adults alone. '96 The presence of children in the
educational environment does not justify the imposition of controls
upon students that would not be placed upon individuals in society
generally: 97
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitari-
anism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their
students. Students in school as well as out of school are "persons"
under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights
which the State must respect ....
92. See note 2 supra.
93. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
94. A constitutional challenge either on due process or eighth amendment cruel
and unusual punishment grounds was unsuccessful in any of the cases cited in note
86 supra. For a review of corporal punishment challenges on grounds that such pun-
ishment, viewed as an evolving standard of civilization and human decency, see Note,
6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LiB. L. REV. 583 (1971).
95. See note 2 supra.
96. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). The Gault Court penetrated the "treat-
ment veil" of the juvenile court system to insist that youth offenders did not surrender
constitutional rights upon entry into that system. The "educational veil" for educa-
tional institutions is analogous.
97. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
See also Gyory, The Constitutional Rights of Public School Pupils, 40 FoRD. L. REV.
201 (1971); Ladd, Allegedly Disruptive Student Behavior and the Legal Authority of
School Officials, 19 J. PUB. LAW 209, 218 (1970).
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The Court's decisions in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School
District,98 In re Gault99 and Goss v. Lopez'00 express the doctrine that
children possess full constitutional rights of adults even in a special
institutional setting. 10' Even in prisons corporal punishment involves
a deprivation of liberty which is impermissible absent fourteenth
amendment protections. 0 2
It is thus advisable that provisions relating to corporal punishment
be included within the Washington disciplinary rules. Attention should
be given to the circumstances under which corporal punishment may
be used, the permissible degree of force and the parties that may ad-
minister such punishment. Provision for the use of corporal punish-
ment in emergency situations, such as self-protection of teachers, is
necessary, but the rules should specify that corporal punishment is the
most drastic disciplinary alternative open to educators and that it
should be utilized as a last resort and only in situations set forth in the
rules. Additionally, some type of post-punishment conference or
hearing between educational personnel and the student and his or her
parents is desirable. Such a conference must occur after the punish-
ment has been administered, but is necessary to acquaint more fully
the students and parents with the reason for the punishment and to
provide discussions to ensure that such punishment will not be needed
again. Inclusion of corporal punishment within the Washington rules
would lend some predictability to that aspect of the disciplinary
process and would tend to protect students against arbitrary discipline
or errors of school officials.
III. CONCLUSION
The Washington due process rules for public school students should
98. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
99. 387 U.S. 1 (1967); see note 96 supra.
100. 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975).
101. In contrast, searches of student lockers for evidence by police with the con-
sent of school administrators have been upheld on in loco parentis grounds. See, e.g.,
People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 229 N.E.2d 596, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967): People
v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d 909, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (App. Div. 1971); Note, Is the School
Official a Policeman or a Parent? 22 BAYLOR L. REV. 554 (1970).
102. United States v. Jackson, 235 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1956). The court held that
dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a federal case was erroneous in the case of
a prisoner to whom corporal punishment was administered by a guard. The fourteenth
amendment applied to a prisoner: "He still has his right to be secure in his person
against unlawful beating done under color of law wilfully to deprive him of . ..
[his fourteenth amendment] right ...... Id. at 929.
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serve as a model for school authorities in other states both for the
method by which they were adopted and for their extensive proce-
dural and substantive rights for students. The rules grant full constitu-
tional rights to children in the educational environment without re-
spect to age. The intent of the State Board of Education is to confine
the discretion of educational personnel in the disciplinary process
within bounds set by written rules and regulations. The prevailing
Washington practices of corporal punishment and disciplinary
transfer and reclassification, both of which are forms of discipline
based on the discretion of the educators, are in apparent disharmony
with the state educational policy enunciated in the rules and may be
expected to be challenged.
Washington has chosen by administrative action to emphasize stu-
dent rights in the educational process. The close cooperation of local
school boards with the State Board of Education in the adoption of
the rules may serve to substantiate and strengthen those rights in the
eyes of educators who must respect and enforce them. Nevertheless,
careful attention to the enforcement of constitutional due process
rights for disciplined students will be necessary in order to ensure that
the rules are properly implemented at the local level.
Philip Talmadge
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